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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Several popular public-key cryptosystems base their security on the problem of 
factorising a (typically) two-factor number. A well-known example is RSA, which 
has been extensively analysed in this regard (see, for example, (Boneh, 1999)) and 
for which the equivalence between breaking the cryptosystem and factorising the 
modulus has been proved to be definitely not true when the private exponent is low 
(see (Boneh and Durfee, 1999), (Boneh and Venkatesan, 1998)). In fact, it has been 
recently proved that the knowledge of RSA (e,d) parameters yields the factorisation 
of the modulus n in deterministic polynomial time (see (Coron and May, 2007)), a 
result much longed for. 
                                                           
1 Partially supported by CDTI, Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio (Spain) in collaboration with 
Telefónica I+D, Project SEGUR@ with reference CENIT-2007 2004 and Ministerio de Educación Ciencia 
of Spain under MTM2005-00173. 
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At the same time, new factorisation methods have been searched for and tried, 
which, if proved effective, could be a severe drawback for the practical use of this 
type of cryptosystems. 
The factorisation algorithms can be broadly divided into two groups: General 
Number Field Sieve, Quadratic Sieve, Elliptic Curve, etc., and the so-called 1±p  
algorithms, which try to factor 1+p  or 1−p  for some factor p of the number n 
under test. Among this type of algorithms, Pollard’s (Pollard, 1974) and Williams’ 
(Williams, 1982) algorithms are the most remarkable ones.  While no precise 
analysis exists about their running times, the 1±p  algorithms are particularly useful 
when all the prime factors of 1+p  are small, and all the prime factors of 1+p  are 
small but for one factor q, such that 1+q  or 1−q  has small prime factors. 
Primes not fulfilling the conditions above might be called “strong”, since they 
are resilient to this kind of factorisation attack, but authors fail to agree on a precise 
definition. Closely related to the notion of “strong” prime, there exists also the 
notion of “safe” prime, for which a lot of literature can be found as well: see, for 
example, (Cai, 1994), (Camenisch and Michels, 1999), (Naccache, 2003), (Wiener, 
2003). The so-called Sophie Germain primes, introduced by that author, are in direct 
connection with safe primes and have been studied since its inception, back in the 
XIX century (see, for example, (Dubner, 1996), (Yates, 1991)). 
There has been a lot of discussion about the convenience of using safe primes 
for certain applications: It has been recommended, for example, for the modulus of 
RSA (Menezes et al., 1997), in order to avoid the attacks of the 1+p  algorithms. 
Another possible application is the BBS (Blum et al., 1986). It has been proved that 
to obtain the longest cycle lengths for this generator, it suffices to have qpn ⋅= , 
where both p and q are safe primes (more precisely, 2-safe primes, whose definition 
will be introduced later on) and n is the modulus for BBS. With additional 
conditions, it is also possible to use 1-safe primes (to be also defined later on) and 
still obtain maximal cycle lengths (see (Hernández Encinas et al., 1997)). 
As a natural extension, we have introduced also the concept of higher-order safe 
primes, for which the concept of signature is applicable. In fact, only the positive 
signature has received attention in the literature (see, for example, (Maurer, 1990), 
(Maurer, 1992), (Maurer, 1995), (Mihailescu, 1994)). For this reason, we have turned 
toward a deeper research on the case of negative and mixed signatures. 
 
 
2. SAFE PRIMES 
 
In this Section we introduce the definition of general safe primes and some 
elementary property. We will skip all the proofs, since they are rather lengthy. 
 
 
19 – 20 September 2008, BULGARIA 3
2.1. Definition and elementary properties 
 
Definition 1 An odd prime integer p is said to be k-safe with signature kεε ,,1 K , 
with { }1,1,,1 −+∈kεε K , if k odd prime integers kpp ,,1 K  exist such that 
kkk pppppp εεε +=+=+= − 2,,2,2 122111 K .The integer k is termed the order of the 
signature. 
Notation 2 The set of prime numbers is denoted by P. For every k > 0, the set of 
k-safe prime integers with signature kεε ,,1 K  is denoted by P( kεε ,,1 K ). We set P+k = 
P( kεε ,,1 K ). when 11 +=== kεε K , and P−k = P( kεε ,,1 K )., when 11 −=== kεε K . 
Proposition 3 If p > 5 is a k-safe prime integer with signature kεε ,,1 K , then 
( )1
1
1 2mod22 +
=
−∑+≡ kk
h
h
h
kp ε  
The proof is essentially carried out proceeding by induction on k. 
Corollary 4 If P ( ) ∅=kεε ,,1 K , then P ( ) ∅=lεε ,,1 K  for l > k. 
Example 5 In the literature, the term 1-safe prime refers normally to the set 
defined by us as P+1, having signature +1. We have also 1-safe primes with signature 
−1, namely, the primes in the set P−1. The former are congruent to 3 modulo 4, 
whereas the latter are congruent to 1 modulo 4. 
Remark 6  The order of the components in the signature is relevant, because it 
can occur that P ( ) ≠kεε ,,1 K P ( ))()1( ,, kππ εε K for a given permutation π of { }k,,1K .For 
example, ∈7 P(+1,−1) and ∉7  P(+1,−1), as follows from Corollary 4. 
Remark 7 The class of 1-safe primes is not be confused with that of Sophie 
Germain primes ((Yates, 1991), (Ribenboim, 1991)), though they are related. 
Actually, if 12 += qp , with p and q prime integers, then p is a 1-safe prime and q is 
a Sophie Germain prime. 
 
 
2.2. Mixed signatures 
 
We introduce now the concept of mixed signature. 
Definition 8 A signature ( )kεε ,,1 K  is said to be mixed whenever indices i, j 
exist such that, kji ≤<≤1  and ( ) 1−=⋅ ji εε . 
Proposition 9 The sets of mixed signature P ( )kεε ,,1 K  are classified as follows: 
1. If k = 2, then P ( ) { }111,1 =−+ , P ( ) { }131,1 =+− . 
2. If k = 3, then P ( ) { }231,1,1 =−++  and all the other ones are empty. 
3. If k = 4, then P ( ) { }471,1,1,1 =−+++  and all the other ones are empty. 
4. If k > 5, then all the mixed signatures are empty. 
The interesting observation here is that the set of mixed signatures is essentially 
empty. 
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2.3. Chains of safe primes 
 
Definition 10 A chain (see, for example, (Forbes, 1999), (Teske and Williams, 
2000)) of safe primes of length k is a sequence of prime integers 11 ,,, −kppp K  such 
that, iii pppp εε +=+= +111 2,2 , 21 −≤≤ ki , and { }1,1 −+∈iε , 11 −≤≤ ki . 
Remark 11 A prime p takes the first place in a k-length chain if and only if p 
belongs to P+k−1 ∪  P−k−1. 
There exist a number of different kinds of prime chains: Cunningham chains, 
Shanks chains, etc. Only Cunningham chains are related to our notion of safe prime 
chains. A Cunningham chain (see, for example, (Teske and Williams, 2000), (Guy, 
1994)) is a sequence of 2≥k  prime integers kpp ,,1 K  such that ε+=+ ppi 21 , 
1,,1 −= ki K , { }1,1 −+∈ε . Observe that if k = 2, then a Cunningham chain of length 
2 is simply a pair ( )12, +qq , where q is a Sophie Germain prime. 
Observe that, by definition, the last prime p of a Cunningham chain of length k 
and signature +1 (resp. −1) verifies that ∈p  P+k−1 (resp. ∈p  P−k−1). 
It is not known whether safe prime chains exist with arbitrary length k, or 
equivalently if the sets P+k, P−k are not empty for every ∈k  N. S. Yates has proved 
in (Yates, 1991) that the maximal length for a Cunningham chain whose first term is 
p and 1=ε  is p − 1. 
Recent records for Cunningham chains have been obtained by P. Carmody and 
P. Jobling, for 1=ε , and by T. Forbes (see (Forbes, 1999)) for 1−=ε . In both cases, 
the length of the longest chain is k = 16, and the first terms are 
=1p 810433818265726529159 for 1=ε  and =1p 3203000719597029781 for 
1−=ε . Both results are reported in (Caldwell, 2005). 
 
 
3. CHAINS OF GENERALISED SAFE PRIMES 
 
The case of positive signatures has received a detailed attention in the literature; 
see (Maurer, 1990), (Maurer, 1992), (Maurer, 1995), (Mihailescu, 1994), whereas the 
negative and mixed signatures have not been studied as far as we know, and, 
consequently, we shall deal with them below.  
Following (Maurer, 1992) basically, we first relax the requirement in Definition 
10 of chains of safe primes by considering chains of the form 
,2 111 ε+= pap  ,2 2221 ε+= pap  …, ,21 kkkk pap ε+=−  (1)
for some positive integers ( )kaaa ,,1 Kr = , which are assumed to be small enough 
with respect to the sizes of the prime integers kpp ,,1 K . 
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Let us first state a result that we will use later on. According to (Bateman and 
Stemmler, 1962), suppose that sff ,,1 K  are distinct irreducible polynomials with 
integral coefficients and positive leading coefficients, and suppose F is their product. 
Let )( NFQ be the number of positive integers j between 1 and N inclusive such that 
)(,),(1 jfjf sK  are all primes. 
Then for large N we have 
).)(log()(log)(!2)(
sss
NF NNoNNFCsQ
−− +≤  
Moreover the constant C(F) is given by  
,)(111)( ∏ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=
−
p
s
p
p
p
FC ω  
and )( pω  denotes the number of solutions of the congruence pXF mod0)( ≡ . The 
proof can be found in the reference above. As a result, the reference (Bateman and 
Horn, 1962) states the following 
Conjecture 12 With the same assumptions and notation as above, the following 
formula is conjectured: 
( )∫ −−−−≅ N ssNF duuFChhhQ
2
1
2
1
1
1
)( log)(L  
where shh ,,1 K  stand for the degrees of the polynomials  
Definition 13 The counting function a
r
r
επ  for k-safe prime numbers of signature 
( )kεεε ,,1 Kr =  and vector ( )kaaa ,,1 Kr =  is defined to be the number ( )xarrεπ  of ∈p  P 
such that xp ≤ , and ,2 111 ε+= pap  ,2 2221 ε+= pap  …, kkkk pap ε+=− 21 . 
We first deal with the negative signatures. 
 
 
3.1. Negative signature 
 
Consider first the case when vector ar  has equal components. Let us state the 
following result: 
Theorem 14 Under the Conjecture 12, if ap  is the least prime divisor of 12 −a , 
then the density of the chains in the equation (1) for the vector with equal 
components aaa k ===K1 , and for 11 −=== kεε K , vanishes for all 1−≥ apk . In 
particular, this holds if 12 −a  is a prime.  
Theorem 15 Let aaa k ===K1 , 11 −=== kεε K , and ap  be as in the previous 
Theorem, and let { }appaD |:P)( ∈=  be the set of prime divisors of ∈a  N. Assume 
2−≤ apk . Then, 
( ) ( )∫
−−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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where ( ) ( )
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( )pae ,2  being the order of 2a in *pZ . 
We consider now the case when vector ar  has unequal components. In the case 
of a vector ( )kaaa ,,1 Kr = with unequal components the results are not so concrete as 
those in the previous section. First of all, we introduce some notations: 
∏
−
+−=
− ≤≤≤≤=
jk
hkl
l
jh
hj hjkha
1
,0,1,2α  (2)
,1,1
1
1
kh
h
l
hlh ≤≤+= ∑−
=
αβ  (3)
{ } { }( ),1,:mod0# *001 khZpN phhhkp ≤≤∈∪= − αβα  (4)
Theorem 16 Let p be a prime number. We consider the notations in equations 
(2)–(4). If either an index kh ≤≤1  exists such that, ph mod00 ≡α  and ph mod0≡β , 
or pN kp = , then ( ) pp =ω , and hence ( ) 0=FC . 
Remark 17 Let ( )01max hkha Dp α≤≤= Ur . If 1+≥ app r , then ph mod00 ≡/α  for 
every .1 kh ≤≤  
Theorem 18 With the same assumptions and notations as in Theorem 16 and 
Remark 17, if 
{ } ( ) ( )( )U
kh
hh DDkpPp
≤≤
−⊆+≤≤∈
1
012: βα  
then ( ) pp <ω  for every ∈p P and hence, ( ) 0>FC . 
Example 19 For k = 6 if we consider all the subsets 
{ } { }18,19,20,15,16,17,1,12,13,147,8,9,10,12,3,4,5,6,,, 61 ⊆aa K  
then the exact number of vectors ( )61 ,, aaa Kr =  fulfilling the hypotheses of Theorem 
18 is 304. 
From the possible 6-tuples obtained above, we supply, as an example, the case 
when ( )18,195,6,14,15,=ar . We, then, have 
( ) { } ( ) { } ( ) { },19,5,3,2,19,3,2,19,2 302010 === ααα DDD  ( ) ( ) ( ) { }.19,7,5,3,2605040 === ααα DDD  
Similarly, 
( ) ( ) { } ( ) { } ( ) { },2393,13,101,11,37, 4321 ===∅= ββββ DDDD  
( ) { } ( ) { }.1097,83,41,1549,241 65 == ββ DD  
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Hence { } ( ) ( )( ) { }.19,7,5,3,272:
61
0 =−⊆≤≤∈
≤≤
U
h
hh DDpPp βα  
For such values of ar  the following ten numbers are safe primes of length k = 6 
and negative signature: 
157213815390109, 448585785745309, 
1025803746270109, 3371555445649309, 
3933752569182109, 3948661711710109, 
6787362449041309, 7090927318033309, 
7228241182609309, 8204853725406109. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we discuss the definition and basic properties of higher-order safe 
primes. We revisit the concept of chains of safe primes and report on the most recent 
records. We then focus our attention on negative and mixed signatures following the 
more relaxed definition given in (Maurer, 1992) for safe primes. This definition can 
be seen as a certain generalisation of the “classical” prime chains. For this type of 
primes, and based on the conjectures of Bateman-Horn (Bateman and Horn, 1962)—
which in turn depend on those of Hardy-Littlewood (Hardy and Littlewood, 1922)—
we provide explicit conditions to find primes fulfilling a particular set of conditions, 
thus allowing the design of algorithms to find them. Finally, we give some examples, 
obtained using these algorithms. 
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